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1970]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

Although the General Motors court recognized that GPLR 302
(a)(3) was primarily intended to provide jurisdictional bases for the
traditional products liability or negligence action,64 it somewhat
reluctantly admitted that the statute applied to conversion cases as
well. 5 The court also noted that the main purpose of the statute, i.e.,
to assist a domiciliary in prosecuting litigation in local courts at minimal expense, had been circumvented here due to the plaintiff's large
corporate size and its resultant ability to litigate in various other jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, the court believed
that the corporate size of the plaintiff was immaterial in view of the
express language of the statute.
If large corporations have indeed found a "loophole" in our longarm statute, it will require legislative action to remedy the defect.
However, the objection voiced by the court applies to the many other
causes of action for which jurisdiction can be obtained pursuant to
302 because large corporations by their very nature generally have the
ability to select the forum in which they wish to prosecute a claim
against a nondomiciliary. And, if the corporations themselves are
subjected to jurisdiction wherever they do business, it would clearly be
inequitable to deny them the use of the same courts which are available
to parties bringing actions against them.
ARTICLE 4-

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

CPLR 407: Personal injury counterclaim denied in summary proceeding where "inordinate delay" would result.
In Great Park Corp. v. Goldberger,6 6 the court recognized that a
64 59 Misc. 2d at 749, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 762; see Homburger & Laufer, Expanding Jurisdiction over Foreign Torts: The 1966 Amendment of New York's Long-Arm Statute, 16
BuFF. L. REv. 67, 70 (1966), where it is recognized that the expansion of products liability
throughout the nation
did much to stimulate the rapid growth of long-arm jurisdiction in the United
States: widening products liability as a matter of substantive law would be
of limited help to a victim who is denied access to a convenient forum. Hence,
the 1966 change is designed to let these plaintiffs freely enter the "tortgate" of
New York's jurisdiction instead of turning many of them away and forcing still
others to squeeze awkwardly through the half-opened doors of the business clause.
65 It would appear that the phrase "commits a tortious act," as employed in CPLR
302(a)(2) and (3) was specifically intended to encompass conversion cases. Before the
enactment of the CPLR, the Advisory Committee proposed that 302(a)(2) be limited to
"tortious acts within the state only if the acts result in physical injury to a person or
property." SECOND REP. 39 (emphasis added). However, this limitation was expressly
rejected: "Under the former proposal a conversion of property within the state would
not have been included as an act of providing a basis for jurisdiction. It is now
included." FINAL REP. A156.
66 41 Misc. 2d 988, 246 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1964).
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summary proceeding is, by its very nature, designed to speedily determine whether a landlord is entitled to the immediate possession of his
real property when he alleges that a tenant's rent is due and owing.6 7
Although the proceedings are meant to be expeditious, the tenant
generally may interpose any equitable defense in the nature of a
counterclaim. But when the counterclaim bears no relationship to the
question of whether the landlord may gain immediate possession of
the property, the courts will not permit such interposition. 8 Accordingly, it has been suggested that the court must "have broad powers
of severance where the joinder or interposition of such claims would
'69
interfere with the summary nature of the special proceeding.
Of course, in terms of general practice, a defendant may usually
counterclaim for any cause of action he could prosecute against the
plaintiff in an independent proceeding.7 0 By sanctioning the liberal use
of counterclaims, the legislature sought to encourage parties to adjudicate all their disputes in one action.7 ' However, the courts possess wide
discretionary powers which enable them to order a severance of a
counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 603 for convenience or to avoid
prejudice.
Similarly, CPLR 407 grants a court-wide latitude when a severance
in summary proceedings is sought. Thus, in Tankoos-Yarmon Hotels,
Inc. v. Smith,72 the plaintiff-landlord made a motion to sever the
defendant-tenant's personal injury counterclaim in the amount of
$25,000. The Appellate Term, First Department, reversing the New
York City Civil Court, held that the counterclaim was unrelated to
the landlord's claim of possession and rent, and, if permitted, would
cause an "inordinate delay." It therefore granted the motion to sever.
A different result might encourage tenants to utilize counterclaims
so freely that the very purpose of the summary device would be defeated.
67 For a more complete factual discussion of this case see The Biannual Survey, 38
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L. Rr'v. 406, 456-57 (1964).
68 Great Park Corp. v. Goldberger, 41 Misc. 2d 988, 989, 246 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812.
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1964).
69 THIRD REP. 159; see also 1 WK&M
407.01 (1966).
70 H. WACHTELL, NEW YozK PRAcTicE UNDR THE CPLR 125 (2d ed. 1966). The CPLR
specifically provides for liberal use of counterclaims. See CPLR 203(c). The test as to
the sufficiency of a counterclaim is whether it will itself support an independent cause of
action against the plaintiff in the same capacity in which he sues. (E.g., as an executor,
an individual or a corporation.) See Geddes v. Rosen, 22 App. Div. 2d 394, 255 N.Y.S.2d
585 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 816, 210 N.E.2d 362, 263 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1965).
71 See generally 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5019, supp. commentary 166 (1969).
72 58 Misc. 2d 1072, 299 N.Y.S.2d 937 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1968).
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